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Noting that South Africa may be one of the few African 
countries that could contribute to mitigating climate 
change, the authors explore the impact of a carbon tax 
relative to alternative energy taxes on economic welfare. 
Using a disaggregate general-equilibrium model of the 
South African economy, they capture the structural 
characteristics of the energy sector, linking a supply 
mix that is heavily skewed toward coal to energy use by 
different sectors and hence their carbon content. The 
authors consider a “pure” carbon tax as well as various 
proxy taxes such as those on energy or energy-intensive 
sectors like transport and basic metals, all of which 
achieve the same level of carbon reduction. In general, 
the more targeted the tax to carbon emissions, the better 
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climate change strategy. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The 
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the welfare results. If a carbon tax is feasible, it will have 
the least marginal cost of abatement by a substantial 
amount when compared to alternative tax instruments. If 
a carbon tax is not feasible, a sales tax on energy inputs is 
the next best option. Moreover, labor market distortions 
such as labor market segmentation or unemployment 
will likely dominate the welfare and equity implications 
of a carbon tax for South Africa. This being the case, if 
South Africa were able to remove some of the distortions 
in the labor market, the cost of carbon taxation would be 
negligible. In short, the discussion of carbon taxation in 
South Africa can focus on considerations other than the 
economic welfare costs, which are likely to be quite low. 
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For at least three reasons, Sub-Saharan Africa’s response to climate change has 
concentrated on adapting to its adverse effects rather than mitigating further increase in 
greenhouse gases.  First, all of Africa contributes less than 4 percent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions, so mitigation will not have major effects on climate change.  Second, the 
stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere today is the result of emissions by rich 
countries.  There is little reason why the world’s poorest continent should now curtail its 
greenhouse gas emissions to compensate for these past excesses.  Third, mitigation 
policies are costly and difficult to implement.  Not only will they impose a cost on 
industries such as energy and transport that emit CO2, the major greenhouse gas, but also, 
levying a carbon tax or limiting carbon emissions will require credible and effective 
institutions, which are arguably in short supply in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
  A possible exception may be South Africa. A middle-income country that 
produces 65 percent of Africa’s and 1.5 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions
3 
as a by-product of its extensive energy production and usage, South Africa has both 
higher levels of emissions  and the capacity to tackle emissions of greenhouse gases. As 
an active participant in the Kyoto and Poznam processes, South Africa is also committed 
to mitigating climate change and has recently developed a Long-term Mitigation Scenario 
(see, for example, Winkler (2008)). Although all countries have the right to exploit their 
own natural resources, international environmental law and global citizenship require that 
countries contribute to alleviating climate change. Moreover, there is a policy risk 
associated with avoiding mitigation—when a carbon price does emerge from climate 
negotiations, there is a risk that South Africa will end up with stranded assets in the form 
of dirty coal-burning generators. Nevertheless, there are some questions about possible 
mitigation measures.  The debate between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program will 
need to compare alternative taxes not only in terms of the welfare and economic impact, 
but also the capacity to recycle tax revenue to achieve further reform, and the impact on 
equity and the poor. To economize on institutions, the consensus seems to be in favor of a 
carbon tax rather than more complex cap-and-trade programs (Aldy et al. (2008), 
Summers (2007), Zedillo (2008)).  But in the absence of a worldwide agreement, how 
high should the tax be?  In principle, the tax should be set so that the marginal cost of 
carbon emissions equals the marginal benefit of the reduced greenhouse gases.  Since the 
latter is still the subject of debate and analysis, there is little guidance on the appropriate 
level of the tax and very little information about its possible economic and welfare 
impact. Furthermore, South Africa currently has no carbon tax.
4 It may instead have to 
tax carbon-intensive products such as energy and transport, which would impose costs on 
the economy.  Finally, even a pure carbon tax would be passed forward into the various 
                                                 
3 World Development Indicators (WDI), 2008. The primary sources of information are the International 
Energy Agency (IEA)’s annual publications, Energy Statistics and Balances of Non-OECD Countries on 
energy use; and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) 
on CO2 emissions.  See also footnote 5. 
4 However, South Africa is one of the first developing countries to announce a partial carbon tax--2 
cent/kWh on electricity from fossil fuels. 
 
  2 
prices of energy (e.g., coal, natural gas, petroleum products) and embodied in the price of 
electricity, possibly hurting South Africa’s competitiveness abroad and employment at 
home.   
 
  In this paper, we explore the implications of using tax policy to mitigate CO2 
emissions in South Africa under alternative scenarios.  Using a general-equilibrium 
model of the South African economy, we simulate a “pure” carbon tax as well as various 
proxy taxes on commodities such as energy and energy-intensive sectors all of which are 
set to achieve the same level of carbon reduction.  By energy, we mean energy inputs 
(such as coal, petroleum, and electricity) utilized in production by each sector.  By carbon 
emissions, we mean fossil fuel emissions and not emissions from land-use change and 
forestry. Since, like most developing countries, South Africa is already replete with a 
number of distortions, such as taxes and subsidies in addition to labor market distortions 
that contribute to the high unemployment rate, we examine whether the introduction of a 
new tax exacerbates or dampens existing distortions.  We find that a direct carbon tax 
imposes the lowest distortion compared with taxes on energy or energy-intensive sectors.  
For a carbon tax that reduces emissions by 15 percent, the cost is roughly 0.3 percent of 
household welfare, whereas a tax on energy-intensive sectors imposes a cost that is close 
to 10 times that amount.
5    
 
  Next, we explore whether the revenue from the carbon tax or the alternative taxes 
on energy could be used to lower other distortionary taxes in South Africa. Not 
surprisingly, recycling revenue in this manner lowers the direct and indirect welfare cost 
of a carbon tax further; tax instruments that generate more tax revenue also provide the 
greatest adjustment in other tax rates. In the case of a tax on energy-intensive industries, 
the welfare cost with revenue recycling actually increases because of the extreme changes 
in output and the high taxes on energy-intensive industries needed to meet carbon 
emission reduction targets. 
 
  Finally, noting that South Africa’s labor market also exhibits severe distortions, 
reflected for instance in the 25 percent unemployment rate, we look at the welfare cost if 
all these distortions were removed.  We find that the welfare cost is significantly lower, 
particularly when labor flexibility in production is improved, indicating that the problem 
with carbon taxation may be its interactions with existing distortions rather than the cost 
of the tax per se.  Put another way, if South Africa were able to remove some of the 
distortions in the labor market, the cost of using tax policy to reduce CO2 emissions 
would be smaller. 
 
  We do not model the incentives for producers to adopt carbon saving technology 
for production directly. Instead, for a given initial production function, producers respond 
to price signals and shift out of taxed inputs to the extent possible. In the long run, one 
would expect a tax on carbon or a tax on energy to result in technology changes. If 
investment brings about greater economic flexibility, the tax on carbon needed to achieve 
a target level of emission reduction will also be smaller. 
                                                 
5 Following standard analysis, we use equivalent variation to measure the welfare impact due to a policy 
change – see Simulation set 1 for further discussion. 
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  Relationship to the literature.  The issue of using taxation to address climate 
change has been surveyed by, among others, Stern (2008), Goulder and Pizer (2005), 
Aldy et al. (2003) and Bovenberg and Goulder (2002).   The analytical framework used 
here derives from Sandmo’s (1975) paper that showed how the cost of taxing an 
externality-creating commodity (such as a commodity with high CO2 emissions), also 
known as a Pigovian tax, depends on the other taxes in the system.  Since these taxes are 
typically there for revenue purposes, Sandmo extended the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) 
result that revenue-raising taxes should fall on commodities with the lowest demand 
elasticity to show that the “optimal” tax is a weighted average of the inverse elasticity 
and the marginal social damage.  In that sense, our paper extends the estimates of the 
marginal cost of public funds for revenue purposes (see, for example, Devarajan et al. 
(2002)) to the marginal cost of carbon taxation.  Since, as mentioned earlier, the marginal 
social damage is still uncertain, we simulate all taxes to generate a fixed level of carbon 
reduction.  
 
  The analytical framework has mainly been applied in the context of developed 
countries.  Using a dynamic general-equilibrium model of the United States, Goulder 
(1998) found that the marginal welfare cost of a Pigovian tax would be reduced if the 
revenue from the tax could be used to reduce pre-existing distortions. Assuming strong 
links between carbon taxes, capital accumulation and productivity growth, Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1993) found that the expected fall of US GNP can be reversed and actually 
increased if the revenue is used to reduce high marginal tax rates on capital in the 
economy.  In a partial-equilibrium application to developing countries, Shah and Larsen 
(1992) showed that welfare could be improved, and carbon emissions reduced, by 
removing subsidies and other distortions in the energy sector.  In a general equilibrium 
analysis of a carbon tax in Thailand, Timilsina and Shrestha (2002) examined the 
economic impact and reduction of emissions from alternative carbon tax rates as well as 
the double dividend of revenue recycling through a lump-sum transfer or a reduction of 
direct income tax.   
 
  The welfare impacts from the two cases of revenue substitution are, however, 
very similar, mainly because a direct income tax in a static model with no factor 
accumulation is similar to a lump-sum transfer. Contributing to the very few analyses of 
developing countries, our general-equilibrium calculation compares the welfare costs of 
carbon taxation with alternative indirect taxes on energy, keeping the emissions target 
similar so that the social benefit of pollution control is comparable across taxes.  We 
investigate the issue of revenue recycling by focusing on the reduction of pre-existing tax 
distortions that are more relevant to a developing economy.  Our model builds on energy-
environment CGE models of developing countries, including Robinson (1990), Lewis 
(1993), Blitzer and Eckaus (1993), Beghin et al. (1994), Yeldan and Roe (1994), 
Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson (1999), Xie and Saltzman (2000), and McDonald, 
Robinson, and Thierfelder (2008) as well as the partial-equilibrium study of presumptive 
environmental taxation of Eskeland and Devarajan (1996). 
 
  In response to South Africa’s commitment to mitigating climate change and its 
Long-term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS), there are a few studies recently undertaken to 
  4 
project the country’s emission trends and economic impacts of various policies over time. 
Van Heerden, Gerlagh, Blignaut, Horridge, Hess, Mabugu, and Mabugu (2006) fix the 
fossil fuel taxes to an equivalent carbon tax of R35 or 5 USD per ton of CO2  in order to 
examine the decline in emissions, the increase in GDP, and a third potential dividend of 
reducing poverty when the taxes collected are recycled to reduce food prices. Pauw 
(2007),  whose work underpins the LTMS,  examines the direct and indirect impact of the 
policy scenarios designed to reduce CO2 emissions (i.e. raising fuel taxes, changing 
production technology, investment costs, capital allocation by sector and  other policy 
measures) on GDP, employment and welfare. Winkler and Marquard (2009) analyze the 
economic implications of a carbon tax, deriving lessons from other countries, reviewing 
findings from modeling works like Pauw (2007) and van Heerden et al. (2006), and the 
policy issues in designing a carbon tax. None of the studies mentioned compare the 
marginal cost of alternative taxes to meet a comparable emission target, using a public 
finance approach that is deployed in our study. 
 
  The study does not cover the practical design issues of a carbon tax and the 
experience is still relatively new.  Some studies are beginning to document the lessons 
and what to avoid. Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) and Vehmas (2005) find that the carbon 
taxes dating to the 1990s in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden do not achieve cost-
effective mitigation of emissions because they permit substantial variations in the tax per 
unit of carbon by fuels and by sectors.  On the other hand, British Columbia, Canada 
imposes a carbon tax with uniform rate across fossil fuels (Government of British 
Columbia, 2008), but it is still too early to evaluate its impact.  Moreover, there is no 
clear pattern to how the tax revenue from a carbon tax is used. Sweden began to recycle 
the carbon tax revenue in 2000 to reduce labor taxes (Government of Sweden, 2005). 
British Columbia uses the carbon tax to reduce taxes paid by both individuals and 
businesses.  Norway’s carbon tax, on the other hand, goes to the general budget 
(Daugberg and Pedersen, 2004).
6 
 
  Section II of the paper presents an overview of the economic framework, the CGE 
model of South Africa, its distinctive features as well as how CO2 emissions were 




II.  Overview of South Africa’s Economic Framework 
 
To examine tax policy and carbon mitigation strategies described in this paper, we 
employ and extend a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of South Africa, a 
framework well-suited to analyze consumer and producer behavior and the impact of 
public policy embodied in taxes and public expenditures on the distribution of income 
and economic welfare.  Extensions are made to better represent energy use, energy taxes, 
and CO2 emissions in the South African economy, allowing energy demand and therefore 
                                                 
6 For those interested in the practical experience and difficulties of the European Union’s Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS), Aldy et al. (2008) has a good summary. 
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carbon emissions to respond to changes in energy prices, including those caused by taxes. 
In what follows, we describe the model, including how the economy of South Africa is 
represented and how CO2 emissions and a carbon tax are incorporated into the 
framework.   
 
  The economic structure of South Africa.  South Africa is the largest middle 
income country in Sub-Saharan Africa, its gross national income accounting for about 40 
percent of the region’s total income.
7  It has a population of about 47 million and a per 
capita income of $ 5,390. Being more advanced, its economy is also more diversified 
than many developing economies.  Agriculture accounts for only 4 percent of total value 
added while the service sectors are together the largest share of value-added (69 percent) 
followed by industry sectors (27 percent).  The economic structure is represented by 43 
sectors in the framework, three of which are energy sectors: coal, petroleum and 
electricity & gas (see Annex Table 1). Crude oil for domestic consumption is mainly 
imported and there is no tariff on crude oil.
8  The data in the model are from a 2003 
social accounting matrix (SA
9 M).  
 




Coal (342 million metric tons)
Oil    ( 72 million metric tons)
Gas   (  5 million metric tons)
 
  Source: IEA (2006). 
 
Energy use and CO2 emissions in South Africa.  CO2 emissions depend 
primarily on energy use and the CO2 coefficient or intensity of each energy input.  
Because of its heavy energy usage and reliance on coal, South Africa’s energy-related 
                                                 
7 The share is in terms of values in US dollars. Alternatively, the share is 32 percent in term of comparable 
purchasing parity power among countries. Figures are 2006 numbers from the WDI 2008 and calculated 
using the World Bank Atlas method. 
8 This is an extension of the initial data base which does not include the sector crude oil; we disaggregate 
crude oil imports from the category other minerals. 
9 The data construction was commissioned by the World Bank in 2002/2003 and developed by Claude Van 
der Merwe from Quantec. See Van Der Merwe (2002) for a description of the sources used.  
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CO2 emissions are relatively high among developing countries, estimated to be 443.6 
million metric tons in 2006 by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), ranking it 
11
th globally, placing it among developing countries behind China (6018) and India 
(1293), South Korea (515) and Iran (477), but just ahead of Mexico (436) and Brazil 
(377). Within Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria (101) is a distant second to South Africa
 .
10  In 




  The pattern of CO2 emissions in South Africa is due to a supply mix that is 
heavily skewed towards coal as the main natural resource for energy.  Of the total energy 
consumption of about 5.0 quadrillion Btus, 75.4 percent is coal, 20.1 percent oil and the 
rest is accounted for by natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectricity and other renewables.  
Although crude is mainly imported, 40 percent of total oil consumption is now accounted 
for by synthetic liquids processed from coal and gas. As a result of this pattern of energy 
use, 85 percent of the energy-related CO2 emissions is attributed to coal in 2003, the base 
year of our framework; only about 12 percent is due to oil and a very small amount (1 
percent) is due to natural gas (Figure 1). In our framework, we also treat electricity as a 
significant energy input.  
 
Table 1: Energy expenditures as a percent of value added in each production sector 
            
Coke and Refined Petroleum Products  79.27    Health and Personal Services  6.94 
Basic Non-ferrous Metals  57.02    Other Mining    6.47 
Basic Iron and Steel  53.86    Wearing Apparel    6.37 
Basic Chemicals  42.93    Plastic Products    6.33 
Rubber Products  40.56    Coal Mining    5.93 
Electricity, Gas, and Steam  37.50    Furniture    5.25 
Transportation and Storage  35.32    Glass and Glass Products    5.03 
Other Chemicals and Man-Made Fibers  27.29    TV, Radio, and Communication Equip  3.94 
Water Supply   16.38    Business Services    3.66 
Construction and Civil Engineering  12.39    Other Transport Equipment    3.50 
Machinery and Equipment  12.01    Paper and Paper Products    3.40 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  11.18    Wholesale and Retail Trade    3.33 
Catering and Accommodation  11.10    Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories  3.25 
Food   10.93    Other    Producers    3.16 
Professional and Scientific Equip  10.13    Other Industries    3.11 
Metal Products Excluding Machinery  9.84    Footwear    2.96 
Textiles    9.64    Wood and Wood Products    2.73 
Communication  9.35    Beverages and Tobacco    2.58 
Electrical Machinery  9.02    Government Services    1.91 
Non-metallic Minerals  8.47    Printing, Publishing, and Recorded Media  1.62 
Gold and Uranium Ore Mining  8.33    Financial Services    0.74 
Leather and Leather Products  8.33         
Source: SAF SAM 2003, sectors ranked from most to least energy intensive. 
 
                                                 
10 Figures in paranthesis are corresponding CO2 emissions in million metric tons.  The estimates compiled 
by EIA, IEA, and CDIAC – all U.S. government agencies –based on energy use and made in consultation 
with national statistical and energy related agencies and companies - are generally consistent with another. 
There are some slight differences in the latest and more preliminary numbers – for example, South Africa is 
ranked 12
th in the IEA/CDIAC/WDI, just behind Mexico but ahead of Iran.   
 
11 See Figure 1 in the forthcoming 2010 World Development Report (WDR). 
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  The relative importance of energy in each production activity may be 
characterized through its energy expenditure as a percent of the corresponding net output 
or value added, as shown in Table 1. Sectors with a high ratio of energy expenditures 
relative to value added include:  refined petroleum products (79.27 percent), basic non-
ferrous metals (57.02 percent), basic iron and steel (53.86 percent), basic chemicals 
(42.93 percent), rubber products (40.56 percent), gas, electricity & steam (37.50 percent), 
and transportation and storage (35.32). 
 
Table 2: CO2 coefficients for energy inputs, 2003 
In millions of metric tons of CO2 emissions per billion rand of energy input 
Coal 34.25 
Petroleum   0.84 
Electricity & gas   0.00 
 
Notes: The small amount of emissions from gas is attributed to petroleum, given that 
the SAM combines electricity and gas into one sector. Households and producers are 
assumed to have the same CO2 coefficient for energy consumption.  
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) International Energy Annual, 
2006, for emission data and SAF SAM 2003 for data on intermediate spending on 
coal and petroleum.   
 
 
  Table 2 shows the derived CO2 coefficients that are consistent with the CO2 
emissions for each aggregate energy input (Figure 1) and the energy input expenditures in 
the 2003 SAM.  The coefficients suggest how clean or dirty the production technology is 
for a particular energy source or input, the dirtiest being coal energy, the main energy 
input in South Africa.
12   In the SAM, electricity and gas are lumped together as a sector 
and input. Because the emissions arising from natural gas is very small, we combine its 
emissions into oil in our framework, so that electricity & gas sector mainly connotes 
electricity in terms of carbon content, thus isolating its key characteristic as energy in 
South Africa:  electricity is relatively clean by itself, but it relies primarily on coal to 




                                                 
12 Because of the lack of data, we do not adjust the energy expenditures by input and sector for relative 
prices and other factors in order to reflect more accurate energy quantities or equivalents. For a single 
country analysis, this is not as critical as in a multi-country comparison. Moreover, sectoral approaches to 
estimating energy quantities consistently understate the total level of CO2 emissions because of data issues.  
For example, for South Africa in 2004, IEA reports CO2 emissions of 421 million tons based on aggregate 
quantity of energy inputs and 343 million tons by the sectoral approach.  For modeling purposes, the CGE 
database of the Global Trade Analysis (GTAP), version 6.0, from Purdue University, also provides 
emissions for South Africa by sector that total 299 million tons in 2001.  Compared to the corresponding 
EIA number of 399 million metric tons based aggregate energy quantities, the GTAP numbers seem to be 
derived from EIA’s sectoral approach. In Table 2, the derived coefficients are applied uniformly except in 
two sectors - basic iron and petroleum, where adjustments were made to make them closer to the CO2 
coefficients from sectoral approaches.  For basic iron, the CO2 coefficient for coal is 12.65 and for 
petroleum it is 0.42. For petroleum, which is mainly imported, the CO2 coefficient for coal and petroleum 
is zero. 
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 Table 3 CO2 emissions by production activity and energy input (million metric tons) 






Electricity  198.83 0.20  199.04  47.6 
Basic Iron and Steel  70.87 0.55  71.41  17.1 
HH total  11.37 25.42  36.79  8.8 
Transportation and Storage  0.72 17.76  18.49  4.4 
Basic Non-ferrous Metals  9.90 1.64  11.54  2.8 
Metal Products Excluding Machinery  9.34 0.33  9.67  2.3 
Other Mining  7.03 1.08  8.11  1.9 
Food  6.44 0.95  7.38  1.8 
Other Chemicals and Man-Made Fibers  5.28 1.67  6.95  1.7 
Water Supply   5.43 0.06  5.50  1.3 
Basic Chemicals  0.94 4.10  5.03  1.2 
Government Services  2.74 2.17  4.91  1.2 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  0.00 3.65  3.65  0.9 
Health, Community, Social, and Personal Services  2.25 1.11  3.35  0.8 
Rubber Products  2.54 0.46  3.01  0.7 
Business Services  0.00 2.94  2.94  0.7 
Wholesale and Retail Trade  0.00 2.71  2.71  0.6 
Construction and Civil Engineering  0.00 2.45  2.45  0.6 
Machinery and Equipment  1.65 0.67  2.32  0.6 
Communication  0.00 2.31  2.31  0.6 
Textiles  1.53 0.13  1.67  0.4 
Non-metallic Minerals  1.09 0.19  1.28  0.3 
Wearing Apparel  1.20 0.07  1.27  0.3 
Beverages and Tobacco  0.63 0.13  0.77  0.2 
Catering and Accommodation  0.50 0.22  0.73  0.2 
Gold and Uranium Ore Mining  0.53 0.18  0.70  0.2 
Paper and Paper Products  0.42 0.12  0.54  0.1 
Coal Mining  0.00 0.45  0.45  0.1 
Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories  0.00 0.44  0.44  0.1 
Leather and Leather Products  0.41 0.01  0.42  0.1 
Other  Producers  0.00 0.41  0.41  0.1 
Electrical Machinery  0.00 0.38  0.38  0.1 
Plastic Products  0.00 0.37  0.37  0.1 
Wood and Wood Products  0.28 0.06  0.33  0.1 
Other Industries  0.00 0.32  0.32  0.1 
Financial Services  0.00 0.31  0.31  0.1 
Professional and Scientific Equip  0.00 0.06  0.06  0.0 
Printing, Publishing, and Recorded Media  0.00 0.04  0.04  0.0 
TV, Radio, and Communication Equip  0.00 0.04  0.04  0.0 
Other Transport Equipment  0.00 0.04  0.04  0.0 
Furniture  0.00 0.04  0.04  0.0 
Glass and Glass Products  0.00 0.03  0.03  0.0 
Footwear  0.00 0.01  0.01  0.0 
Coke, Refined Petroleum & Gas  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.0 
Total  341.93 76.30  418.23  100.0 
Source: CO2 coefficients from Table 2 and intermediate energy input by production sector from SAF SAM 
2003. 
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  The amount of carbon emissions by each production activity will depend on the 
type and amount of energy being used as inputs and the carbon emissions associated with 
each energy input.  Table 3 shows the carbon emissions for different productive sectors in 
South Africa based on their energy expenditures and the CO2 coefficients in Table 2.    
 
  Summarizing the information further in Figure 2, the sectors that generate the 
most carbon emissions in South Africa are the production activities that use the most coal 
or electricity, followed by public and private transportation due to the consumption of 
petroleum. The characteristic of the electricity sector is now apparent: although using 
electricity in various economic activities is fairly clean, producing it is another story. 
Because of its heavy reliance on coal as an input, the power sector is the largest emitter of 
CO2 in South Africa, accounting for 48 percent of the total CO2 emissions.  Sectors that 
produce metallic products are also fairly dirty because of their use of coal to fire up 
furnaces, emitting about 22 percent of the CO2 emissions as a group. The transportation 
sector combined with household use of petroleum accounts for 10.5 percent of total CO2 
emission. Households by themselves contribute about 9 percent. Other sectors with 
notable CO2 emissions include the chemical sectors, rubber, water supply, other mining, 
and food manufactures. Although burning petroleum as an energy input is fairly dirty, 
next only to coal in terms of its CO2 coefficient, the sector producing crude oil in South 
Africa hardly emits any carbon emissions because all crude oil is imported, its pollution 














Basic and other chemicals,




  Taxes on the purchase of energy commodities are relatively low in South Africa 
suggesting some potential for using tax policy to regulate carbon emissions.
14 Among 
energy inputs, a 15.4 percent sales tax is applied to purchases of refined petroleum, but 
basically none is applied to coal and electricity & gas (Table 4).
15   
                                                 
13 In the analysis, we ignore all possible taxes on carbon emissions originating from other countries. 
14 From the Energy Détente database, the taxation of gasoline is low in South Africa when compared to 
other countries. 
15 Sales taxes are ad valorem equivalent. 
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Table 4: Sales tax (percent) on energy commodities 
  
      Coal   0.0 
      Refined petroleum  15.4 
      Electricity & gas    0.1 
  
Source: SAF SAM 2003 
 
 
  Modeling energy policies.  The framework is modified from the standard 
specifications of a CGE model widely applied to developing countries by Löfgren, 
Harris, and Robinson (2001) and Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982).
16 Different 
versions of the CGE model for South Africa have been used to analyze a value added tax 
(Go, Kearney, Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2005), oil price shocks (Essama-Nssah, Go, 
Kearney, Korman, Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2008), and a wage subsidy (Go, Kearney, 
Korman, Robinson, and Thierfelder, 2009).    
 
  Following common modeling practice, production in each sector has a nested 
structure (Figure 3), combining different levels of inputs, each level being depicted by 
imperfect substitution through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function or by 
zero substitution through a Leontief technology of fixed coefficients.  Output by activity 
consists of value added and intermediate inputs. Except for energy inputs, intermediate 
inputs are held in fixed shares to output (Leontief technology), each input a composite of 
imported and domestic goods.  Value added is a CES combination of labor and a capital-
energy composite. Three types of labor – skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled – are 
aggregated into a single labor input.   
 
  Each sector potentially has three types of energy inputs, coal, petroleum, and 
electricity & gas, which are combined in an Armington (or CES) aggregation function 
into a single composite energy input. 
17 In the model, the composite energy is treated as a 
primary input that is imperfectly substitutable with capital, implying that energy 
technology is to some extent embodied or associated with invested capital. The level of 
each energy input use is somewhat responsive to the relative costs of alternative energy 
inputs and to the net cost of production as reflected by the returns to capital.  In the 
simulations below, we test the sensitivity of the results to alternative values of the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and energy and among energy inputs.  We also 
examine the extreme case where energy inputs have zero substitution with other 
production inputs, suggesting no responsiveness to price changes in the production 
structure, specifying them as fixed input requirement per unit of output much like the 
Leontief input structure of other intermediate goods, following standard CGE 
specifications found in Löfgren et al (2001).   
                                                 
16 The CGE model equations are solved simultaneously with the computer software package GAMS and 
the solver PATH. 
17 See McDonald, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2008) for a similar specification of production functions with 
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 CO2 emissions are produced by each energy input, the amount of emissions being 
tied to the level of energy usage through a unique coefficient.  Hence, to induce a 
reduction in CO2 emissions, the economic cost of carbon may be raised directly by taxing 
the carbon emissions or indirectly by taxing energy inputs. A tax on carbon is feasible 
because the CO2 coefficients are known.  However, this implies a different tax rate for 
each sector, the tax rate being dependent on the energy and CO2 intensity of that sector. 
The carbon tax per unit of energy input purchased for each production activity is the 
carbon tax rate times the CO2 coefficient. Viewed another way and as a result of this 
specification, the price of energy inputs can differ by user whenever there is a carbon tax 
because the tax applied takes into account the CO2 emitted per unit of energy good used. 
With this additional tax instrument, we can calculate the carbon tax rate needed to reduce 
CO2 emissions by a given target. 
 
  Macro closure and labor market behavior:  In the model, we assume that 
government’s real spending, real investment, and aggregate foreign savings are constant. 
Private savings adjust in order to maintain a fixed total investment in the economy, so 
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that all changes affect household consumption.  This is a standard approach in public 
finance analysis because it provides the welfare results of tax policy in isolation of other 
macroeconomic adjustments, such as changes in investment or government expenditure. 
Domestic savings (savings by institutions or households) are assumed to adjust and the 
economic and welfare effects are driven primarily by changes in net household income 
and consumption as the changes in energy taxes filter through the economy. In addition, 
revenue is fixed in the government budget, allowing the substitution of energy related 
taxes with lump-sum taxes (transfers) on household income or with pre-existing 
distortionary taxes such as sales and excise taxes, or import tariffs. The consumer price 
index (CPI) is the price numéraire.  
 
  One feature that characterizes the labor market in South Africa is the high rate of 
unemployment among low-skilled and semi-skilled workers.  The unemployment rate 
was as high as 29.4 percent in 2001 but has declined to 26.7 percent in 2005 (Statssa, 
2006).  We have taken the interpretation due to Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn, and 
Woolard (2007) that this high unemployment is structural but in equilibrium – that is, the 
nonparticipation of the less-skilled who are jobless is caused by structural problems in 
South Africa as well as various vestiges of the apartheid system in the past, and not a 
voluntary choice. Accordingly, we model all the labor market categories in the reference 
case with aggregate employment fixed exogenously, and wages varying to clear the labor 
market with that employment level. 
 
  We consider how sensitive our results about the marginal cost of abatement are to 
various economic distortions prevalent in developing countries, particularly distortions in 
the labor market. To do so, we modify the labor market closures as described under set 2 
of the simulations below.  
 
  The experiments are comparative statics with capital mobile across all sectors, 
except in coal, gold, and other mining, to mimic long-run equilibrium. No dynamics are 
introduced so that the model cannot look at the implications of adjustment costs of 
investment.  Since the model is fairly neoclassical, the differences between the welfare 
results of a fully intertemporal model and a static one are minimal when the simulations 
are comparable - see, for example, Devarajan and Go (1998). 
 
 
III. Scenarios  and  Results 
 
30.  Given a target reduction of CO2 emissions,  the economic cost or impact of various 
tax instruments depends on several sets of factors:  i) the relative substitutability of 
energy inputs with capital or other intermediate inputs; ii) the relative substitutability 
among energy inputs;  iii) various tax and non-tax related distortions in the economy. We 
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Set 1 of Simulations:  Sensitivity of the marginal cost of abatement by tax policy to 
relative substitution of energy inputs with capital 
 
We examine three alternative taxes to reduce CO2 emissions in South Africa by 15% as a 
target -  i) a carbon tax; ii) a sales tax on energy inputs;  and iii) a sales tax  on energy- 
intensive sectors.  As described previously, a single tax on carbon emissions will imply a 
different tax rate for each activity, depending on the supply mix of energy inputs for each 
sector and the intensity of CO2 emission associated with each energy input. Since energy 
is a primary factor in the basic set-up, a carbon tax operates like a factor tax and there is 
incentive for producers to substitute away from the taxed sector to the extent possible, 
given the production technology.  An alternative to the carbon tax, a sales tax is directed 
to the expenditures on energy inputs by each sector, but not tied directly to the emissions 
level. Like the carbon tax, a sales tax on energy is also a factor tax, raising the cost of 
energy to users.  Finally, a sales tax on energy-intensive sectors such as basic iron and 
steel, transportation, basic non-ferrous metals, and metal products (excluding machinery) 
is the most indirect tax on carbon emissions among the taxes examined. Because these 
sectors are essentially intermediate inputs, the tax will have a cascading effect on the 
input cost structure.  Except for the specific tax on carbon, all other taxes are ad-valorem 
taxes expressed as additional taxes from their existing tax levels in the economy.   
 
The simulated 15% cut in emissions is a significant reduction when held against 
the actual performance of Kyoto signatories such as Canada. At 443.6 m tons of CO2 
emitted, this represents 9.4 tons per capita. Although it is a good starting point, it is still 
far from what is required if climate is to be stabilized this century, where the average per 
capita emissions for the globe may have to reach between 1 and 2 tons per capita.  In 
simulation set 4, we consider alternative emission targets. 
  
  In this simulation, the additional revenue is returned to households through lump-
sum transfers, thus maintaining revenue neutrality. Since there are several household 
groups, we make this as neutral as possible by effectively scaling the saving rates so that 
the aggregate household expenditure for each group is affected uniformly. 
 
  The magnitude of the economic impact of the taxes generally depends upon the 
assumptions about the relative substitution of energy inputs with capital and the relative 
substitution among energy inputs, given the pre-existing economic distortions operating 
in the economy. Energy being a basic intermediate good and because of the structure of 
energy supply/mix in South Africa, these elasticities will generally be low. Sensitivity of 
the results is provided by a reference case and a low elasticity or rigid case. In the 
reference case, the elasticity of substitution is set at 0.2 among energy inputs and 0.4 
between energy and capital. For the low elasticity-rigid case, the value of the elasticity 
parameter is halved at 0.1 for energy inputs and 0.2 for capital and energy, thus bordering 
on the Leontief case of no substitution. The latter in effect provides a floor for various 
distortions that reduce the mobility of resources and which are not explicitly incorporated 
in the framework, such as imperfect competition arising from the market structure of 
industries.  In both cases, the values are still generally low. We relax this assumption in 
one set of simulations below. 
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Table 5: Welfare Impacts of a 15% reduction in CO2 emission by tax policy: 
 
































                 
    I.  Reference case    II.  Rigid case   
1st  (poorest)  11.22 -1.38  0.23  0.80 -1.98 2.23  1.21 
2
nd  15.76 -0.77  1.82  3.37 -1.03 4.79  4.41 
3
rd  21.79 -0.62  1.23 -1.17 -0.66 3.95 -1.15 
4
th  28.41 -0.28  1.92 -0.33 -0.16 4.91 -0.14 
5
th  36.81 -0.41  0.92  -3.9 -0.31 3.29 -4.51 
6
th  47.1 -0.39  0.54 -4.77 -0.28  2.6 -5.59 
7
th  65.6 -0.37  -0.13 -5.29 -0.27 1.33 -6.28 
8
th  92.22 -0.44  -0.95 -5.15 -0.44  -0.29 -6.17 
9
th  135.95 -0.45  -1.84 -4.24 -0.43 -1.8 -5.07 
10th - lower 
5%  105.23 -0.35  -1.51 -3.36 -0.27  -1.26 -4.05 
10th - next 
1.25%  36.12 -0.14  -2.22 -4.39  0.23  -2.08 -5.21 
10th - next 
1.25%  42.62 -0.16  -1.76 -2.63 -0.06 -2.1 -3.25 
10th - next 
1.25%  48.22 -0.12  -1.31 -1.77 -0.11  -1.66 -2.32 
10th – top 
1.25%  99.27 0.02  -0.15 2.78  -0.45  -1.55 2.76 
                 
TOTAL  786.32 -0.33  -0.72 -2.76 -0.35  -0.19 -3.35 
Source: CGE model simulations.       
Notes: 
Energy = coal, electricity & gas, and petroleum; energy intensive sectors = basic iron and steel, 
transportation, basic non-ferrous metals, and metal products excluding machinery. 
In all scenarios, capital is activity specific in coal, gold, and other mining. 
 
  Table 5 shows the welfare impact (measured as standard equivalent variation in 
monetary equivalent of the change in utility) associated with the policy change. Although 
these welfare measures refer only to the cost side of the cost-benefit equation and 
disregard the social benefits associated with the changes in environment quality brought 
about by a reduction of carbon emissions, they are made comparable by keeping the 
target CO2 emissions constant across experiments.  We further express the welfare results 
as percent change from the base values for easy comparison.  Moreover, equity 
implications are derived for household groups by income deciles. The total welfare 
change is a simple aggregation of the welfare results for the households in all income 
groups; although possible, no additional weighting scheme is attempted.  Because of the 
inequality in South Africa, the highest income group is further divided into 5 income 
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subgroups for a total 14 household income groups. For each household group, utility is 
defined by a linear expenditure system (LES). 
 
  The welfare impact has an interesting pattern. All taxes will generally raise 
energy costs and reduce CO2 emissions by their negative impact on production, thus 
lowering welfare in all cases (since the social benefit of reducing CO2 emissions is not 
counted). In the reference case, the carbon tax shines as the most economically efficient 
among the taxes, its associated welfare loss being lowest. It benefits from being like a 
factor tax, affecting directly the carbon content in each sector, without the cascading 
effects of input taxes. This is followed by the sales tax, where welfare impact is twice that 
of the carbon tax.  The sales tax on energy-intensive sectors is the worst. Its indirect and 
negative impact affects many economic activities since they are important intermediate 
goods.  
 
  In the rigid case, a lower economic flexibility prevents significant substitution and 
the wider dispersion of the higher energy cost throughout the economy. In this situation, 
it is difficult for producers to substitute capital for energy so energy-intensive sectors will 
contract more than when the production structure is more flexible.  Likewise, non-energy 
intensive sectors will expand further. When the economy is less flexible, a sales tax on 
energy does better than other taxes in terms of its welfare impact. Some of the welfare 
change can be attributed to second best effects of tax changes in a distorted economy –
output of high productivity, low energy sectors expand the most following a sales tax on 
energy.
18 Reducing the substitution elasticities does not seem to affect the welfare loss 
associated with a carbon tax, which remains low. This is because lower elasticities mean 
the economy’s response, and hence the welfare losses, are also lower.  The worst case 
continues to be a sales tax on energy-intensive sectors.  
 
  The equity impact of each tax is a different story.  The sales tax on energy inputs 
has the best results as it imposes no burden on the lower income groups. The sales tax on 
energy intensive sectors places no burden on the lowest income groups, but unlike the 
sales tax on energy inputs, the sales tax on energy intensive sectors hurts some of the 
lower income groups. The carbon tax is generally regressive, imposing the highest 
relative burden on the lower income groups.  The pattern is the same for both elasticity 
cases. Interestingly, in the rigid case and for both sales taxes, the welfare gains for low 
income households are greater than in the reference case and the gains extend to more 
households. This is because the income to capital, which goes to the richer households, 
declines much more than in the reference case, contributing to the larger decline in 
welfare of the richer household groups. 
  
  In summary, a carbon tax is the best option in terms of the consistency of its 
aggregate efficiency or welfare results in both low and higher elasticity cases. If a carbon 
tax is not feasible, a sales tax on the energy inputs would be the next choice, especially 
given its positive equity impact.  Nonetheless, except for the sales tax on energy-
                                                 
18 As noted below in table 8, when factor market distortions are removed, a sales tax on energy-inputs is not 
the best tax in terms of welfare costs. This comparison suggests that the results reported in table 5 are due 
to second-best effects from the factor markets. 
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intensive sectors, the welfare changes are all quantitatively small, generally measuring 
much less than 1 percent from the base value of welfare. We examine the issue more 
carefully below along with the fiscal and economic results. 
 
  The macroeconomic and fiscal results of the various tax policies are shown in 
Table 6.  Except for the sales tax on energy intensive sectors, the negative impact on 
GDP or consumption is generally less than 1 percent for both elasticity cases.  Following 
the welfare results, the GDP and consumption effects of a carbon tax remain generally 
the same in both elasticity cases.  Likewise, the impacts for a sales tax on energy are 
much less in the rigid case when compared to the corresponding numbers in the reference 
case. Although the percent changes are generally small, the annual losses in output could 
amount to about $330 million for the carbon tax case. 
 


























I. Reference Case 
  
II. Rigid Case 
Carbon tax per metric ton of 
CO2 emissions  0.10       0.17     
     Rand  96.25       165.22     
     USD  12.72       21.84     
Additional tax rate     0.33  0.44    0.44  0.48 
Ratio of additional tax revenue 
from meeting CO2 Emission 
target to total tax revenue  0.09  0.30  0.75  0.16  0.50  0.91 
          
GDP  (percent  change)  -0.20 -0.41 -1.47  -0.20  -0.02 -1.76 
Consumption  (percent  change)  -0.32 -0.66 -2.34  -0.31  -0.03 -2.80 
Factor Adjustment (percent)               
   Capital  0.67  1.32  3.04  0.90  2.10  3.70 
   Energy  4.81  10.54  7.31  4.80  9.86  7.20 
   Low-skilled labor  0.50  0.89  3.30  0.78  1.53  3.90 
   Medium-skilled labor  0.48  1.07  3.06  0.79  1.85  3.77 
   High-skilled labor  0.37  0.84  2.46  0.60  1.44  3.01 
          
Source: CGE model simulations. 
Notes: Factor adjustment is percent of total employed workers who must find another job as a result of the policy shock. 
Energy = coal, electricity & gas, and petroleum; energy intensive sectors = basic iron and steel, transportation, basic non-ferrous metals, and 
metal products excluding machinery. 
 
  
  The degree of substitution possibility has the expected effects on the tax rates, 
being higher for the lower elasticity case. In order to attain a 15 percent reduction in 
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carbon emissions, the carbon tax is about $22 per metric ton in the low elasticity-rigid 
case and about $13 per metric ton in the higher elasticity case, all in 2003 US dollars.  
The revenue potential is reflected by the ratio of the additional energy tax revenue in 
question to total government revenue, showing high figures in particular for the low 
elasticity case and for the sales tax on energy-intensive goods. 
 
  Factor adjustments indicate the transition costs of using tax policy to target CO2 
emissions which leads to structural changes in the economy. As reported in Table 6, 
factor adjustments, measured as the proportion of the employed labor force that must 
change sectors of employment, are modest for a tax on carbon and increase as the tax 
instrument becomes less direct. In the rigid case, the adjustment costs are slightly higher 
than for the same tax instrument in the reference case. In the worst case, a tax on energy-
intensive sectors in a rigid economy, the transition costs appear manageable –3.9 percent 
of low-skilled workers must find new jobs and 3.7 percent of capital is relocated. 
  
  For a technical explanation, we recall the results due to Sandmo (1975) regarding 
the optimal second-best taxation of commodities as applied to the case of externality-
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If the Pigovian tax does not satisfy all the revenue requirement of government, then 
taxation of other commodities k in the first equation above follows the familiar result 





k    should generally be 
levied on commodities with inelastic demand or low elasticity  k  . The second equation 
shows that correction for an optimal Pigovian tax rate  m  , which is a weighted average of 
the inverse elasticity and the marginal social damage.
19 The marginal social damage of 
                                                 





u    between good m as a private good 
and as a public good; it enters additively over  n  consumers with identical preferences and does not affect 
the other commodities in set  k . The tax rate in the Pigovian case depends very much on the weight  

     , where    is the marginal utility of income (or leisure) and     is the marginal effect 
(negative) of the tax requirement on social utility.     is therefore interpreted as the marginal rate of 
substitution between private and public    income; the lower     is, the higher the tax requirement from 
the optimal Pigovian tax. As     increases, the marginal social damage increases in value and when  
, 1     subsidies are implied from the efficiency or first term. When   , 1    the existing Pigovian tax 
requirement is satisfied exactly and no additional distorting taxes or subsidies are needed at the margin. 
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climate change is of course beset with uncertainty regarding its magnitude and timing. 
Moreover, it is global in nature, encompassing many factors; ideally, there should be only 
one global price for carbon affecting all supply and demand decisions worldwide. We 
simplify the issue by focusing only on one country and by targeting a given level of 
emission reduction for all taxes in question, making the taxes comparable. We set aside 
what may be an optimal tax rate inclusive of the social gains from emission reduction. If 
the welfare cost of the tax per se is small, the overall welfare impact will likely be 
positive if the social gains in reducing carbon emissions can be measured and added. 
Doing so also means that standard public finance theory regarding the optimal taxation of 
commodities will apply to the results. The ratio of the deadweight loss to the revenue that 
the tax collects would be the product of the tax rate and the relevant elasticity.  Because 
the elasticity for energy/fuel related activities which emit the most CO2 are generally low, 
Summers (1991) has argued that the deadweight loss from a tax on those activities will 
tend to be small, which was confirmed by the results in Tables 5 and 6.  There are two 
further corollaries to the low elasticity.  First, the revenue effect will likely be strong.  
Second, just as a low elasticity case makes revenue generation compelling, it also means 
that a high tax rate is needed to attain any meaningful level of emissions reduction. If 
passed through to production decisions, the high tax rate will create greater distortions in 
the rigid case and may eventually raise the welfare cost.  
 
  Impact on various sectors.
20  Figure 3 illustrates the impact on the output of 
various sectors for a carbon tax in the reference case.  In general, a higher energy cost 
resulting from a carbon tax will generally dampen the production of energy intensive 
activities, such as basic iron and steel, basic non-ferrous metals, metal products, 
electricity, coal mining, machinery and equipment, etc.  Not all industries will be affected 
negatively, however. Although energy is now more costly to every sector, what matters is 
the relative or economy-wide repercussions as substitution in demand and supply interact 
to affect resource reallocation.  In the end, sectors such as wood and wood products, 
agriculture, basic chemicals, paper and paper products, footwear, beverages and tobacco, 
textiles, food, etc. will benefit, because they are more intensive in the use of non-energy 
factors. The basic chemicals sector is not adversely affected because any petroleum input 
comes mainly from imports, implying a less direct and indirect carbon content in 
domestic production.   
 
  Second best effects arising from distortions in the sectors and factor markets will 
also have consequences on the aggregate welfare in the economy. In particular, there are 
sectoral differences in the productivity of labor and capital (see simulation set 3 below),  
which means that there will be welfare gains when a high productivity sector expands or 
a low productivity sector contracts, the net effect being dependent on the changes in the 
structure of output following the tax policy shock.  These factor market distortions partly 
explain the case of the sales tax on energy in Table 5, where the welfare loss is lower 
when the economy is rigid compared to the flexible case (-0.19 versus-0.72).  Output of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20 We only present two set of sectoral results so that the details do not distract from the main story or 
arguments. However, each experiment will have their own sectoral results and they are available as part of 
the generated outputs of a CGE model. 
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the high productivity sectors expand more in the rigid case than the flexible case, 
dampening the welfare losses from the tax policy shock in that scenario.   
 
  Figure 3: Percent change in output following a tax on carbon emissions with lump 




Figure 4: Percent change in output following a tax on energy-intensive sectors 
with lump sum redistribution  of tax revenue collected, low elasticity or rigid case 
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Output changes are modest when there is a tax on carbon in the reference case – 
output adjustment range from a 3 percent expansion to a 15 percent decline, with the 
contraction concentrated mainly in a few very energy-intensive sectors (see Figure 3). 
Output adjusts most dramatically when there is a tax on the least direct instrument to 
target CO2 emissions, a tax on energy-intensive sectors, in a rigid economy, see Figure 4. 
Output changes range from a 30 percent expansion to a 50 percent decline. As noted in 
Table 5, the overall welfare loss is highest because of various second-best effects, 
including factor productivity differences by sector, the distortions arising from taxing 
intermediate goods and their cascading effects in the cost structure, the high tax rates 
associated with low demand elasticities in order to reach the targeted reduction of carbon 
emissions, etc. In both cases, output declines the most for basic iron and steel, basic 
nonferrous metals and metal products. 
 
 
Set 2 of Simulations:  Sensitivity of the welfare impact to pre-existing tax distortions  
 
Because of the revenue effects, the potential of a double dividend from environment 
taxation has received great attention in the literature, particularly for developed countries. 
That is, in addition to the social benefit of reducing the environment damages, there is an 
added benefit from revenue recycling if the revenue is used to substitute for other 
distorting taxes in the economy thus reducing the overall welfare loss from taxation in a 
second-best setting. In an extreme case, the welfare change turns positive. Do the 
prospects of revenue recycling apply to developing countries such as South Africa, 
allowing for significant and further tax reform?   The results in Timilsina and Shrestha 
(2002) for Thailand suggest a weak double dividend, but the numbers are small and they 
do not compare alternative energy taxes or look at the relevant distortionary taxes 
prominent in a developing country.  In our simulations, we look at the implications of 
revenue recycling for all three taxes by scaling uniformly all indirect taxes (production 
taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, and import tariffs) that are not part of the policy 
experiment while maintaining revenue neutrality. The experiment is similar to Goulder 
(1998) but applied to the distortionary taxes more relevant in developing countries and 
for a target reduction of carbon emissions.
21 
 
  Table 7 shows the prospects for tax reform from revenue recycling in South 
Africa. Recycling the revenue to reduce distortionary indirect taxes will lower the welfare 
cost of each tax by a significant amount, with one notable exception – the sales tax on 
energy intensive sectors. In the case of the carbon tax, recycling will lower the welfare 
loss to a very low 0.27 percent in both elasticity cases, about 30 percent less than without 
tax reform from revenue recycling.  Tax substitution benefits the sales tax on energy 
inputs the most in the rigid case, its strong revenue allowing for a significant reduction of 
pre-existing tax distortions; its welfare change almost zero, very close to being a strong 
double dividend.  As noted earlier, some of the welfare differences for this scenario can 
                                                 
21 Goulder (1998) considers a reduction in factor taxes as a result of revenue recycling.  Note, however, that 
with a double dividend, the tax structure may become unbalanced, highly or narrowly dependent on 
carbon/energy tax for revenue. 
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also be attributed to the pattern of output changes and second best effects from factor 
productivity differences by sector. 
 
 
Table 7: Welfare Impacts with Tax Reform from Revenue Recycling 































               
   I.  Reference case     II.  Rigid case 
1st  (poorest)  11.22 -1.09  1.06  2.83 -1.56  3.42  2.88 
2
nd  15.76 -0.91  1.51  1.28 -1.35  3.88  1.09 
3
rd  21.79 -0.31  2.15  0.40 -0.18  5.47  0.06 
4
th  28.41 -0.26  2.05 -1.78 -0.19  4.96 -2.57 
5
th  36.81 -0.04  1.99 -2.48  0.29  5.17 -3.40 
6
th  47.1 -0.01  1.62 -3.43  0.34  4.51 -4.57 
7
th  65.6 0.01  0.94  -3.95 0.36  3.21  -5.24 
8
th  92.22 -0.16  -0.18 -4.76  0.03  0.97 -6.31 
9
th  135.95 -0.17  -1.16 -3.50  0.02  -0.74 -4.83 
10th  -  lower  5%  105.23 -0.12  -0.95 -2.89  0.09  -0.37 -4.19 
10th - next 1.25%  36.12  0.30  -1.11  -1.83  0.97  -0.23  -2.86 
10th  -  next  1.25%  42.62 -0.13  -1.75 -4.16 -0.02  -2.24 -5.82 
10th  -  next  1.25%  48.22 -0.30  -1.83 -5.26 -0.42  -2.75 -7.21 
10th  –  top  1.25%  99.27 -1.10  -3.21 -9.92 -2.39  -7.27  -13.19 
                 
TOTAL  786.32 -0.27  -0.56 -4.07 -0.26  -0.05 -5.59 
Adjustment to other taxes  -0.25  -0.70  -3.07  -0.44  -1.35  -3.74 
Source:  CGE  model  simulations.          
Notes: 
Energy = coal, electricity & gas, and petroleum; energy intensive sectors = basic iron and steel, transportation, basic non-ferrous 
metals, and metal products excluding machinery. 
In all scenarios, capital is activity specific in coal, gold, and other mining. 
Under revenue recycling, there is an equiproportionate change in the tax rates for all indirect taxes (production taxes, sales taxes, value 
added taxes, and import tariffs) that are not part of the policy experiments. Also, no revenue is recycled back to reduce base taxes on 




  Although the equity impacts follow the pattern of the previous results in the Table 
5, there is further improvement for a sales tax on energy and a sales tax on energy 
intensive sectors.  The reduction in other tax rates due to revenue recycling will generally 
benefit the poor. In the case of the sales tax on energy, welfare improvement is noted up 
to the 7
th income deciles for the rigid case, thus in fact registering strong double 
dividends for most income groups except the top deciles. 
 
  The one clear exception is the sales tax on energy-intensive sectors, where the 
aggregate welfare losses are higher instead of lower when compared to Table 5.  In this 
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case, the substitution of the taxes in question is basically trading one type of economic 
distortion for another. Following Diamond and Mirrlees’ (1971) production efficiency 
lemma, an optimal commodity tax does not disrupt production efficiency, all distortions 
being focused only on consumer choice. Reducing pre-existing distortions arising from 
other indirect taxes (as afforded by revenue recycling) should therefore ameliorate the 
initial welfare cost of taxing the energy intensive sectors.  However, the energy-intensive 
sectors that are taxed higher - such as basic iron and steel, transportation, basic non-
ferrous metals, and metal products (excluding machinery) – are intermediate goods, 
causing production inefficiency with the higher taxes on those goods. The welfare impact 
is offset somewhat by the reduction of other indirect taxes and their associated distortions 
through revenue recycling.  Being intermediate goods, their demand elasticities are low, 
signifying high potential for revenue recycling, actually generating the most revenue 
among the taxes in question, requiring in turn deeper cuts in other indirect taxes in the 
experiment that maintains revenue neutrality. Cutting other indirect taxes and the 
economic distortions associated with them will however encourage production and 
increase carbon emissions in sectors other than the energy-intensive sectors, forcing 
further and higher increases in the relevant energy tax in order to achieve the target 15 
percent reduction in carbon emissions.   
 
  As noted in Table 7, other indirect taxes are reduced over 300% when the revenue 
from a sales tax on energy-intensive sectors is used to reduce other tax distortions – the 
tax rates become subsidies. The point of this extreme case is that the less directed the tax 
instrument, the less effective is revenue recycling, its revenue potential actually working 
against its effectiveness as a Pigovian tax and against the benefit of tax substitution in 
lowering pre-existing tax distortions.   
 
 
 Set 3 of Simulations:  Sensitivity of the welfare impact to factor market distortions 
 
We examine the sensitivity of the welfare results to a few key distortions existing in the 
factor markets in South Africa. The first is the sectoral differences in productivity for 
each factor, such as wage differences for labor of the same type across production 
sectors. The model incorporates such distortions by specifying fixed ratios of the 
marginal product of a factor in a sector to the average return of that factor, the standard 
way of introducing factor market distortions. Such differentials are not entirely due to 
differences in efficiency but also to factor segmentation such as lack of mobility, 
adjustment cost, etc.  We examine their impact on the marginal cost of a new tax policy 
by specifying a “distortion free” base where these factors of proportionality are all one.  
The experiment is similar to the marginal cost of public funds analysis in Devarajan et al. 
(2002) but applied to a target level of emissions reduction instead of an additional unit of 
revenue.  Revenue is returned to the households by lump-sum transfer similar to the 
simulations in Set 1.  Since the impact on different household groups retains the same 
pattern found in the previous two sets of simulations, we only report the aggregate 
welfare impact. 
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  As shown in Table 8, removing wage differences for labor of the same type across 
production sectors raises welfare losses slightly for the carbon tax and significantly for 
the sales tax in both elasticity cases. In the rigid case, sales tax is no longer superior to the 
carbon tax.  The worst case remains the sales tax on energy-intensive sectors, registering 
a negligible improvement. Clearly, the lower welfare losses previously reported for the 
carbon and sales tax on energy were partly due to their interaction with labor market and 
pre-existing tax distortions, seemingly benefiting in the process. More specifically, the 
expanding sectors in the current experiment, which were previously the high productivity 
sectors in Figure 3, will no longer provide an additional welfare gain when factor  
productivity is equalized across sectors for each factor. Nevertheless, within the results of 
Table 8, the carbon tax is still clearly superior to the other taxes. 
 
 
Table 8: Welfare Impacts of Labor Market Distortions or Specifications 
Equivalent Variation, percent change from Baseline Household Expenditure 
  
tax on carbon 
emission by 
activities 
Sales tax on 
energy 
sales tax on energy-
intensive sectors  
      
I.   Removing sectoral differences in productivity for each factor  
      Reference case  -0.48  -1.40  -2.62 
      Rigid case  -0.69  -1.91  -3.33 
      
II.  Higher substitution elasticity among factors of production 
      Reference case  0.04  0.91  -1.84 
      Rigid case  0.26  2.42  -2.17 
      
III.  Unemployment in the low and medium skilled workers   
      Reference case  -0.90  -2.94  -9.01 
      Rigid Case   -1.01  -3.27  -11.14 
 
 
  Labor market segmentation or rigidity in South Africa is further reflected by a 
low elasticity of substitution among factors of production, particularly among unskilled 
and skilled labor. The relative complementarity among labor types is a key factor in 
preventing the additional employment of unskilled labor, with the scarcity of skilled 
workers acting as a constraint - see, for example, Go et al. (2009).  To test this distortion, 
we raise the elasticity of substitution between labor and the capital-energy aggregate and 
between labor types all to 2.0 as a second experiment in Table 8.  The carbon tax and the 
sales tax on energy will now result in welfare gains due to second-best effects, which 
essentially rechannel resources away from sectors with high carbon or energy intensity to 
sectors with relatively high productivity and low carbon/energy contents, such as other 
products, financial services, agriculture, wood products, basic chemicals, and leather, the 
resource reallocation being much stronger in the rigid case when the associated energy 
elastcities are low and for the case of a sales tax on energy.  The results emphasize the 
critical role of labor market flexibility and its interactions with other pre-existing 
distortions as well as the introduction of the carbon or sales tax.  Further tests (not 
shown) confirm that raising labor market flexibility as postulated will also lower 
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significantly the welfare cost of removing sectoral wage differences for each labor type 
(experiment I of  Table 8) or introducing unemployment (as defined in experiment III 
below).  
 
  The third labor market distortion examined is the unemployment problem in 
South Africa.  As an alternative to the base case in set 1, we allow for unemployment 
among low-skilled and semi-skilled formal workers, with sticky real wages, while the 
other labor markets clear in equilibrium, similar to the formulations in Go et al.(2009) 
and Lewis (2001).  The unemployed are not fully represented in the utility function, so 
the specification is not ideal.  However, there are high within-household income transfers 
in South Africa, so that the consumption of the unemployed is represented in the various 
household units – see Banerjee et al. (2007) and Moll (1993). The results in the third part 
of Table 8 show that welfare losses for various tax options will increase significantly 
when compared to the case in Table 5. With a lower welfare impact, the carbon tax is still 
better than other taxes.   
 
  With sticky real wages, a carbon tax will generate a 1 percent reduction in 
employment of either low-skilled and slightly more for medium-skilled labor, in either 
the rigid or reference case (Table 9). Employment losses are more dramatic with a tax on 
either energy or energy-intensive sectors. When there is a tax on energy-intensive sectors, 
employment can decline over 16 percent in the rigid case. 
 
Table 9: Percent change in employment of low-skilled and medium-skilled labor  























sectors   
     
  I.  Reference Case  II. Rigid Case   
Low-skilled labor  -0.96  -4.28  -13.46 -0.91  -5.62  -16.56   
Medium-skilled  labor  -1.33  -4.99 -13.81  -1.67  -6.93 -16.78   
           
 
  The three experiments in this set suggest that labor market distortions in South 
Africa matter very much.  In particular, unemployment will likely raise the cost of carbon 
taxation significantly while effecting greater labor market flexibility will lower the 
marginal abatement cost.  If labor market reforms are difficult to implement, the previous 
results of Table 7 still suggest that either a tax on carbon or a tax on energy inputs can 
reduce the pre-existing tax distortions significantly and substantially reduce the welfare 
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Set 4 of Simulations:  Sensitivity of the carbon tax to the elasticity of substitution and 
alternative levels of emissions reduction 
 
The carbon tax is lower in the reference case ($12.72) than in the rigid case ($21.84). We 
further investigate the effect of elasticity values on the carbon tax required to reduce 
emissions by 15 percent (Table 10). We also add the extreme case where energy inputs 
are part of the intermediate cost structure with zero substitution elasticity (a Leontief 
technology).  In that extreme case, the carbon tax rises to about $127. The tax drops 
rapidly with higher values of elasticities. One possible interpretation of this result is that, 
if investment brings about a better and cleaner technology with better substitutability 
between capital and energy and among energy inputs, the required carbon tax will fall.  
This result suggests another use of the potential revenue of the carbon tax – to finance 
investment in new and alternative-energy technologies. Such analysis, however, will 
require a different and more dynamic analysis, including estimation of the possible cost 
structure of new and cleaner energy technology – which is beyond the scope of the 
present paper.  
 
Table 10:  Sensitivity of the carbon tax  
to the elasticities 
Elasticity of substitution   
between capital 
and energy 




        tax on 
carbon ($ per 
metric ton) 
2 0.5  $3.70 
2 0.1  $4.36 
1.2 0.1  $6.00 
0.8 0.1  $8.72 
0.4 0.2  $12.72 
0.2 0.1  $21.84 
0 0  $127.04 
 
  We also test the sensitivity of the effects of a tax on carbon to the target level of 
emission reductions, considering a 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 percent reduction in CO2 
emissions. As seen in Table 11, the tax on carbon increases non-linearly, as targets 
increase, the tax needed to achieve them increases at an increasing rate. To achieve a 25 
percent reduction in CO2 emissions, the tax on carbon must increase $32. Likewise, 
welfare loss are non-linear, ranging from a decline of 0.04 percent to 1.15 percent, but the 
direction of change is the same. Even for a 25 percent reduction in emissions, the welfare 
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Table 11: Sensitivity of the effects of a tax on carbon to the target emission reduction 
  Emission Reduction 
  Base 5%  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Welfare  786.32  -0.04  -0.14 -0.33 -0.65 -1.15 
Carbon tax  as a percent of total tax revenue  0.00  2.40  5.40  9.13  13.81  19.79 
Carbon tax per metric ton (USD)  0.00  2.95  7.05  12.72  20.65  31.91 
Carbon tax per metric ton (Rand)  0.00  22.29  53.32  96.25  156.21  241.38 
 
           
  In relation to South Africa’s Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS), its “Use 
the Market” scenario uses a starting carbon tax of R100 per ton, which is remarkably 
close to the calculated tax in the reference case (although the numbers in our study are in 
2003 rand and US dollars). Hence, the emission target of 15 percent in this study could in 
effect be interpreted as an independent estimate of the emissions reduction possible for 







Political, social and economic considerations will affect South Africa’s policies to reduce 
carbon emissions. In this paper, we have focused on one dimension and one instrument, 
namely the economic costs of the distortions created by different taxes applied to reduce 
carbon emissions.  We find that the welfare costs of achieving significant reductions in 
CO2 emissions are fairly small. In general, the more targeted the tax to carbon emissions, 
the better the welfare results. If a carbon tax is feasible, it will have the least marginal 
cost of abatement by a substantial amount when compared to alternative tax instruments.  
Furthermore, the welfare losses from a tax on carbon are small regardless of the 
elasticities of substitution in production. If the revenue generated can be used to reduce 
pre-existing tax distortions, the net welfare cost becomes negligible. If a carbon tax is not 
feasible, a sales tax on energy inputs is the next best option, which has a better equity 
impact and a better welfare result if the substitution elasticities are really low, given the 
existing distortions in the economy. 
 
  There are several points worth emphasizing. The simulations do not account for 
the social gains of emissions reduction and there are no dynamic or productivity gains 
including from benefits from clean technologies. Our approach is therefore conservative, 
by leaving out welfare gains. Even then, we find that the welfare cost is still small and 
manageable.  
 
  Moreover, a carbon tax may be relatively simple to implement among alternative 
policy instruments because the carbon content of individual fuels is fixed 
                                                 
22 However, Pauw’s “use the market” scenario also includes projections about the change in the structure of 
energy use and changes in investment and savings needed to achieve the higher investment levels.  We do 
not include those changes. 
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stoichiometrically per unit of fuel and there are currently no ways to actually abate 
emissions (absent carbon capture and storage technologies). So tax rates can be fuel- 
specific and tuned to the actual carbon content. This is important because the analysis 
shows how much lower the welfare losses are for the carbon tax instrument. 
 
  The results confirm the conventional argument that the relevant deadweight loss 
will generally be small for energy related taxes. Moreover, labor market distortions such 
as labor market segmentation or unemployment will likely dominate the welfare and 
equity implications of a carbon tax for South Africa.  This being the case, if South Africa 
were able to remove some of the distortions in the labor market, the cost of carbon 
taxation would be negligible. With the supply mix of energy being tilted towards coal, the 
adoption of a cleaner technology, possibly financed in part by the revenue potential of a 
carbon tax, is an important medium-term policy issue.  Although mitigation-related 
public finance issues are the focus in the paper, adaptation measures will also be 
important for South Africa.  In addition, South Africa interacts with other countries in 
southern Africa and there is potential to share power resources in the region. Finally, 
there may be carbon leakages as South Africa imports goods from neighboring countries 
with lower taxes applied to energy goods. All these are areas for further research. 
 
  In sum, the discussion of whether South Africa should tax carbon emissions can 
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APPENDIX 1:  
PRODUCTION SECTORS IN THE SOUTH AFRICA CGE MODEL 
 
Aggregated Sector  Components  Percent of Total 
Output 
Agriculture  Agriculture Forestry and Fishing  3.5 
Fuels & Minerals  Coal Mining 
Gold and Uranium Ore Mining 
Other Mining 
6.5 
Food Products  Food 




Leather and Leather Products 
Footwear 
1.5 
Manufacturing  Wood and Wood Products 
Paper and Paper Products 
Printing Publishing and Recorded Media 
Coke and Refined Petroleum Products 
Basic Chemicals 
Other Chemicals and Man-Made Fibres 
Rubber Products 
Plastic Products 
Glass and Glass Products 
Non-metallic Minerals 
Basic Iron and Steel 
Basic Non-ferrous Metals 
Metal Products Excluding Machinery 
Machinery and Equipment 
Electrical Machinery 
TV Radio and Communication Equipment 
Professional and Scientific Equipment 
Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories 




Utilities  Electricity Gas and Steam 
Water supply 
2.4 
Construction  Construction and Civil Engineering  4.5 
Services  Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Catering and Accommodation 









General Government Administration 
General Government Defense 
General Government Law and Order 
General Government Education 
General Government Health 
General Government Social Services 
General Government Economic Services 
13.2 
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Government Revenue Structure 
Source  Percent of Revenue Collected  
Taxes on firms  20.5 
Taxes on households  37.3 
Taxes on production activity  15.7 
Tariff revenue   2.2 
Consumption based value added tax, net of rebates  15.4 
Sales tax on consumption   8.9 
 
 